The calibration theorem by Rabin (2000) implies that seemingly plausible smallstake choices under risk imply implausible large-stake risk aversion. This theorem is derived based on the expected utility of wealth model. However, Cox and Sadiraj (2006) 
Introduction
How well expected utility (EU) theory describes human behavior in general, including in small-and intermediate-stake gambles, has recently been discussed intensively. At the core is what expected utility is expressed as a function of. This note provides a simple extension of some important aspects of this discussion to a life cycle setting where people derive utility from consumption (instead of wealth or payoffs), and illustrates this with numerical implications based on experimental data from Holt and Laury (2002) . Rabin (2000) presents an important theoretical contribution in terms of a calibration theorem that implies conclusions of the following kind: "If for all wealth levels an expected utility maximizing person turns down a 50-50 lose $100/gain $200 gamble, he would also turn down a 50-50 lose $200/gain $20,000 gamble." While it may seem plausible that some people would turn down the first gamble (for all wealth levels), it seems much less reasonable to turn down the second. According to Rabin and Thaler (2001, 206) : "Even a lousy lawyer could have you declared legally insane for turning down this bet."
1 An important feature of this calibration theorem is that it does not assume anything regarding the functional form of the utility function. However, the "for all wealth levels" part of the theorem is important.
Although one can derive less extreme versions without this assumption, one must still assume 1 Given that "expected utility" refers to "expected utility of wealth," it is actually straightforward to derive an even stronger conclusion, as follows: "If for all wealth levels an expected utility maximizing person turns down a 50-50 lose $100/gain $200 gamble, he would also turn down a 50-50 lose $200/gain infinity gamble." Let K denote the (cardinal) gain in utility U from a wealth increase from w to 200 w + , where is initial wealth. Then if the individual turns down a 50-50 lose $100/gain $200 gamble, it follows by concavity that the utility loss from a wealth change from w to is at least 2K. Since this holds for all initial wealth levels it would also hold for the initial wealth ; hence we know that a wealth increase from . Thus, the expected utility change is negative irrespective of r, i.e. irrespective of the gain. (One can easily obtain less extreme versions by replacing the "for all wealth levels" with "for wealth levels up to w+ Δ .") Moreover, by replacing $100 with an arbitrary positive number A in the above analysis, it follows more generally that, "If for all wealth levels an expected utility maximizing person turns down a 50-50 lose A/gain 2A gamble, he would also turn down a 50-50 lose 2A/gain infinity gamble." that the individual would have made the same choice had he been substantially wealthier than what he actually is (see Rabin and Thaler and footnote 1 in the present paper). Largely based on the implications of this theorem, Rabin (2000a, b) and Rabin and Thaler (2001) argue more generally that EU theory cannot explain behavior based on small-stake gambles, and hence that we need some other theory; they suggest a combination of loss aversion and mental accounting.
However, Cox and Sadiraj (2006) question this conclusion in a recent paper. They show that for the small-stake risk aversion assumption of Rabin (2000) , implausible large-stake risk aversion would not follow for the expected utility of income (EUI) model, where utility is expressed as a function of payoffs, in contrast to the expected utility of final wealth (EUW) model. 2 Moreover, since the global small-stake risk aversion assumed by Rabin (2000) has no implication for the EUI model, it has no general implication for EU theory either. It is clear that Cox and Sadiraj have a valid and important point since EU theory is very general and builds on a set of axioms that do not preclude that utility may depend on wealth, income, experimental payoffs, or almost any state variable.
3
In the light of the findings by Cox and Sadiraj, one may be inclined to conclude that what has become known as the Rabin critique is overstated. Perhaps applied economists interested in measuring people's risk preferences or analyzing behavior based on existing estimates can ignore the Rabin critique and continue to interpret their results in terms of the concavity of universally valid utility functions? However, the results in this paper suggest that such a conclusion would be premature.
In applied economic analysis people often make decisions over time, deriving instantaneous utility based on their present consumption level. Under risk, the conventional 2 Although it is clear from Rabin (2000 a, b) and Rabin and Thaler (2001, 2002) that they focus on the EUW model in their analyses, some of their statements may seem to imply (or at least have been interpreted to imply) a criticism of expected utility theory more generally. Cox and Sadiraj (2006) also consider a more general twoargument model where utility depends on both initial wealth and payoff. 3 Samuelson (2005) , Rubinstein (2006), and Harrison et al. (2007) have provided similar arguments.
3 assumption is then that people maximize the expected present value of future instantaneous utility (e.g. Deaton 1992; Gollier 2001) . We will denote this model the expected utility of consumption over time (EUCT) model, and take it as our point of departure. An obvious example is how to best invest retirement savings; see e.g. Gomes and Michaelides (2005) . 4 In the EUCT model, utility is expressed as a function of a flow variable (unlike the EUW model), i.e. consumption, and implies complete asset integration (as in the EUW model), meaning that the gains from a risky choice will be treated in exactly the same way as income or wealth obtained in any other way.
The main contributions of the present paper can be summarized as follows: First, the relations between the EUCT model, on the one hand, and the EUW and EUI models, on the other, are analyzed in Section 2. It is concluded that the EUCT model is essentially equivalent to the EUW model when the wealth measure in the EUW model consists of the present value of all future consumption or income. In addition, it is shown that the functional form of the instantaneous utility function, which is expressed as a function of current consumption, carries over in a straightforward way to a utility function that is expressed as a function of the present value of all future incomes, if and only if the instantaneous utility function belongs to the class of functions characterized by hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA), which is a flexible functional form that includes CRRA and CARA functions as special cases (Merton, 1971) .
Second, by using data from a careful experimental study by Holt and Laury (2002) For example, whether based on constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) or constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences, a majority of the subjects from Holt and Laury would (given that they are EUCT maximizers) in the base case prefer an income level that with certainty would enable them to for the rest of their lifetime consume 36,000 USD annually, rather than a risky alternative where they with a 1% probability would be able to consume 35,990 USD annually and with a 99% probability an infinite amount. This clearly seems implausible. Similar implausible results are then obtained also for broader class of HARA preferences. Section 4 generalizes and demonstrates that the main conclusions hold also under uncertain future incomes and for a time-inconsistent formulation.
Compared to the results based on the EUW model by Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler (2001) , the results here are less general in the sense that they depend on specific functional forms. On the other hand, the results here are less restrictive in the sense that they do not rely on any assumption that the choices would have been the same for all lifetime wealth levels, or for any higher lifetime wealth levels than the individuals currently have or expect to obtain. 5 Section 5 concludes that the standard EUCT model appears inconsistent with available experimental small-and intermediate-stake data.
The EUCT model
The standard approach when dealing with intertemporal choices under uncertainty is to maximize the expected present value of future instantaneous utility (e.g. Deaton 1992; Gollier 5 However, note that the choices for CARA preferences would have been the same for all lifetime wealth levels. When utility is CRRA, by contrast, we know that an individual that is indifferent between accepting a risky gamble would always accept it for higher wealth levels than the present one.
2001
). Let us start with the intertemporal consumption choice under certainty and in the next step take risky decisions into account.
The intertemporal choice problem and HARA preferences
Here an individual experiences the instantaneous utility at time t (from now), where u is increasing and strictly concave. Assume that the individual will live for T more years, and, as is standard, an additive and time consistent utility formulation such that the individual will maximize ( )
where ρ is the pure rate of time preference, sometimes denoted the utility discount rate. We will refer to U as utility. Under certainty, U is purely ordinal, so that any monotonic transformation of U is permissible and hence constitutes an equally valid measure of utility.
Under risk, however, each possible utility outcome U i must be interpreted in a cardinal sense, so that only affine transformations are permissible. The expected value of U, E(U), is nevertheless still ordinal. 6 The intertemporal budget constraint implies that the present value of future consumption equals the present value of future income, so that , 
For example, if is CRRA, can we then know that also ( )
If this is the case (and it turns out that it is), it simplifies the analysis largely, since it is then straight forward to reduce the dynamic problem to a static analogue and work with the V-function instead of the u-function. We will start by considering a more general result on the relation between to , followed by a more specific result which is straight forward to apply in the subsequent numerical analysis: 
follows that an affine transformation of U, U , is also HARA such that
Proof: see Appendix. Note first again that since U is an affine transformation of U, U is both a valid measure of utility under certainty, and a valid measure of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility under risk. This result will be used repeatedly in Section 3. Note also that Proposition 2 holds whether a constant consumption path is optimal or not, i.e. whether r ρ = or not.
It is easy to verify that the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion, defined based on the instantaneous utility function, is in the HARA case given by '' 1 ' These results will also be used in the numerical calculations in Section 3.
Introducing risk i t y
Consider now a lottery with the income path for with probability 0 t ≥ i p , where the realized income path is revealed before the consumption path is chosen. Expected utility is then given by ,
( ) ( )
x where each element of the optimal consumption path will satisfy (3), and where is the lottery gain. Again, we see that the EUCT model is equivalent to the EUW model in the case where wealth is defined as the present value of all future incomes Y. Note that (17) holds generally, whereas in the case of HARA preferences we also have that the functional form carries over from to . It is also noteworthy that Proposition 2 implies that the choice of an individual with HARA preferences in a choice between lotteries with different lifetime incomes, implying different feasible future constant consumption streams, is independent of the individual's time preference
Assuming that the potential gains x (which can be positive or negative) from the lottery occur today, we can write expected utility as 
are the associated coefficients of absolute and relative risk aversion, respectively. The literature based on life cycle consumption behavior often refers to values of R in the 0.5-3 range. 10 According to Kocherlakota (1996, 52) , "A vast majority of economists believe that values above 10 (or, for that matter, above 5) imply highly implausible behavior." The ratio between the present value of all future consumption and the standard deviation of the monetary outcome of a risk experiment is typically very large. This implies that the risk premium must be a tiny fraction of the standard deviation of the monetary outcome for the behavior in the risk experiment not to be described as "highly implausible" by the above quotation, which will be illustrated further in the next section.
Numerical illustration based on data from Holt and Laury (2002)
There are many suitable experimental studies that could be used to illustrate the implications of the above model, but let us here rely on the well-known and carefully undertaken study by Holt and Laury (2002) , who elicited the risk preferences of (mainly) US university students by using real money experiments with different stake sizes. Each student made a number of pairwize choices between one less risky (Option I) and one more risky (Option II) gamble; see 
From (5) and (6) we can easily solve numerically for R and A.
Consider now for comparison the EUI model where the lotteries are evaluated in isolation, and hence independent of other incomes. The EUI model is therefore of course in general not consistent with EUCT. In the CRRA case we have: .
Clearly, since x is typically small compared to , (7) should generally result in a smaller R than (5), when indifferent between the two lotteries. However, in the CARA case, where initial wealth does not affect choices, (6) still holds (corrected for the scale of A). The reason is of course that the expected utility change of a lottery is here independent on the initial Consider first for comparison the result of the EUI model, where the experimental gains are evaluated independently of people's baseline income and wealth levels. It can be observed from Table 1 that, based on the CARA preferences as expressed in (6), the median parameter of absolute risk aversion A is between 0.101 and 0.299 based on the low-stake lottery, and between 0.015 and 0.026 based on the high-stake lottery. Based on CRRA preferences, the median parameter of relative risk aversion R is calculated from (7) to be between 0.146 and 0.411 based on the low-stake lottery, and between 0.411 and 0.676 based on the high-stake lottery.
Consider now the conventional EUCT model. In the CARA case, A of course remains the same, since with CARA preferences the choice between risky options are independent of initial wealth; cf. e.g. Rabin and Weizsäcker (2007) . Since the parameter estimates differ largely between the high-and low-stake lotteries, this suggests that CARA does not constitute a good approximation of subject preferences. However, the main concern here is whether the orders of magnitude constitute reasonable reflections of globally valid instantaneous utility functions. In the CRRA case, we clearly need estimates of S and in order to solve for R in (5). Let us therefore assume that the subjects are 20 years old, that they expect to live until they are 80 (i.e. that they have 60 years left), that the real market interest rate is 5% annually, and that they quite pessimistically will earn future incomes that will enable them to consume .1048 USD with probability 0.6 and 10001.6839 USD with probability 0.4, and in option II 10004.0518 USD with probability 0.6 and 10000.10524 USD with probability 0.4.
As can be seen in Table 1 , the median R is now larger than 19,000 based on the lowstake lottery, and larger than 2,800 based on the high-stake lottery. These are clearly values way above what is generally considered to be plausible, i.e. values in the range of 0.5 to 3, or in any case considerably smaller than 10. 12 Note that we have made no assumption regarding the pure rate of time preference ρ , and all results are independent of whether the students actually would prefer to have a future increasing or decreasing consumption path over time. If the future annual consumption of the subjects would be larger than 10,000 USD, then the implicit parameters of relative risk aversion would of course be even larger.
However, one may also believe that students have liquidity constraints and hence face a larger real interest rate than others. Let us therefore make the extreme assumptions of an annual real interest rate of 500% (instead of 5%). Solving for R in (5) Consider the choice between a safe and a risky option concerning a subject's future income. In the safe option he will with certainty for the rest of his life earn an amount corresponding to a constant annual consumption of per year. In the risky option he will with probability p obtain the high future income level that corresponds to a constant annual consumption level of S c H c , and with probability 1 p − a low future income corresponding to the constant annual consumption level . We can then solve for from (5) and (6) for the CRRA and the CARA cases as follows:
In the special case where the "lucky" outcome implies an infinite consumption level, and where R > 1 and A > 0, (8) and (9) reduce to:
<<Table 2 about here>> ⋅ 13 This is because . Table 2 illustrates the case where the lucky consumption level is infinite, and where moreover the probability of a lucky outcome is as high as 99%. Consider first the CRRA case with a 5% interest rate. The first line of Table 2 reveals that indifference between the safe and the risky option implies the same R as indifference between Option I and Option II in Table 1 .
Consequently, if people's behavior can be described by the EUCT model with CRRA preferences, the same fraction (66%) would prefer the less risky option. This means that 66%
of the subjects in Holt and Laury would actually prefer being able to consume 36,000 USD annually with certainty rather than being able to consume an infinite amount with a 99% probability and 35,991 USD annually with a 1% probability. If we instead draw on the results from the high payoff lottery in Holt and Laury, the results become less extreme, although only slightly. Indeed, as shown from the fifth line, as many as 62% would prefer the safe option (36,000 USD annually) before a risky one with a 1% probability of being able to consume 35,942 USD per year and a 99% probability of gaining infinite consumption. If we consider the extreme case of 500% interest per year, the implied choices are still absurd. Moreover, as observed in the third and fourth column of Table 2 , when considering CARA (instead of CRRA) preferences the results are consistently even more extreme. 
More general HARA preferences
While HARA is the mostly used flexible functional form of the utility function, the second most used is the so-called Expo-power utility function (Saha, 1993) . Both of these flexible forms include CRRA and CARA as special cases. However, since the Expo-power function has some unattractive characteristics, in particular in regions of extreme risk aversion, we will here focus on the HARA function. Still, we will briefly describe some features of the Expopower function, and how it in principle can be used, in the Appendix.
The HARA instantaneous utility function, ( ) 
From (12) we can solve for β for a given value of α , and vice versa, or solve for either α or β for a specified relationship between them. It is convenient for presentational purposes to rewrite (12) for 0 
whereas we for 0 
Moreover, suppose now that α and β have been identified based on a risk experiment, such as the one by Holt and Laury, for an individual. Let the same individual choose between a safe and a risky option regarding all future income levels, as in the previous case for CRRA and CARA preferences. Given indifference between the options we can solve for as follows:
Let us now again focus on the extreme case where the high income outcome implies an infinite consumption level. For 1 β < , (14) then converges towards
In 
Here too, there are no extreme risk averse choices with respect to the above thought experiment of future wages. The reason is that in order to match indifference in both the first low-payoff pairwise choice and the second high-payoff pairwise choice of Holt and Laury, the utility function has to have an extreme curvatur in this region. This, in turn, implies that the local risk aversion for small changes around 0 c = 10,000 will be extremely large, whereas it will decrease rapidly fo els.
For example, the relative risk aversi ption level is . This implies that we will obta rd in absu and with a 0.01% probability would obtain an amount corresponding to 9999.84 per year (since utility converges to minus infinity at this level).
Thus, we observe absurd large stake implications based on the choice behavior in the Holt and Laury experiments for all HARA utility functions consistent with either the behavior in the small stakes experiment, the large stake experiment, or both. Overall, it can then be concluded that the major conclusions about absurd large stake implications based on the hoice behavior in the Holt and Laury experiment hold much more generally than for CRRA es. 
Generalizations
In Section 3 we found that the EUCT model does not seem to be consistent with the experimental data provided by Holt and Laury (2002) , and that absurd conclusions follow also when based on pessimistic forecasts regarding future income and with an extremely high interest rate. In this section we provide further generalizations. First we consider a setting where we take future income uncertainty into problems in findings are robust to these genera
Uncertainty in future income
So far we have assumed perfect foresight, i.e. where future income is known, which can be questioned. Let us therefore now assume that future income is uncertain. Let us moreover assume that the true future income will be revealed only once, directly after the experimental bserved. In this way, the impact of the uncertainty is maximized, since s 
In order to obtain some numerical estimates, let us make the extreme assumptions that min 1000 c = USD and max 19, 000 c = per year, so that the expected future income is the same as before (i.e. equally pessimistic). However, numerical calculations of the kind provided in Table 1 reveal in the CRRA case that the implied parameters of relative risk aversion are still absurdly large, although about a factor ten smaller than in the base case. The median values are between 1,926 and 5,675 and between 285 and 492 in the small-and large-stake lotteries, respectively, with a 5% annual interest rate. The corresp 20 in Table 2 would of course then also be extreme. Consequently, the absurd results are not ncome assumptions.
bias model similar to the one used in the seminal work by Laibson (1997) , and many others.
In our continuous time framework, the individual would then at each time period t maximize driven by our deterministic future i
Time inconsistent preferences
So far, we have made the standard assumption that people have time-consistent intertemporal preferences. However, there is much empirical evidence that people in fact often do not make 
σ is the ratio between the weight attached to the present consumption and that for the near future, whereas the relative weights given to future time periods are given by the constant discount rate as in the standard exponential discounting case. In order to focus on the most extreme outcomes, we will solely focus on "naïve" individuals that will not today take into account that they will be time inconsistent also tomorrow; cf. O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) . The Lagrangean associated with the maximization at time t can then be written 
Discussion and Conclusion
The explanatory power of EU theory has recently been discussed intensively (e.g. However, as argued by Palacios-Huerta and Serrano (2006) , the important question is not whether the EU model, or in our case the EUCT model, is literally correct. We know that it is not. What is important for applied economics is the extent to which the model can provide a reasonable approximation of actual behavior. Here the implications of the EUCT model have therefore been investigated based on data from a careful risk experiment reported in Holt and Laury (2002) . The result suggests that the EUCT model is ill-suited to explain experimental behavior in such small-and intermediate-stake gambles. The calculated implicit risk-aversion parameters are found to be unreasonably large, and therefore can not constitute concavity measures of universally valid insta base case with CRRA preferences, making conservative or realistic assumptions regarding future wages, etc., the median coefficient of relative risk aversion is above 2,000 even based on the high-stake lottery choices, despite that most analysts seem to agree that R should be in the 0.5-3 range, or at least not larger than 10.
Even more strikingly, the results also suggest unreasonable implications in terms of what these degrees of risk aversion would correspond to for long-term risky choices in terms of the subjects' future consumption levels. Whether based on CRRA or CARA preferences, most subjects from Holt and Laury would in the base case EUCT model prefer a certain income enabling them to for the rest of their lifetime consume 36,000 USD annually instead of a risky alternative where they with a 1% probability would be able to consume 35,990
USD annually and with a 99% probability would be able to consume an infinite amount.
Moreover, since the results in Holt and Laury (2002) where Û is an affine transfor m that, when consumption is optimal, the instantaneous utility at any point in time is a measure of overall utility U.
Next we will consider the implications of affine optimal consumption functions for the underlying utility function, and show that i 
Similarly, differentiating (3) with respect to the interest rate r, we obtain * ( 
From (A18 we c n in principle solve for ) a ω for a given value of σ , and vice versa, or solve for either ω or σ for a specified relationship between them. However, the functional form implies that for extreme values of risk aversion, as we have here, the combination of an exponential and a power function makes the EP function very sensitive to small deviations in parameter values, which in turn makes it difficult for numerical calculations to converge. For example, in the neighborhood of the CRRA case we have that the EP function here implies that the number e should be taken to the power of the product of two terms, where one goes to zero and the other is larger than 10,000 to the po w-stake lottery), i.e.
f . Table 3 , as follows: Table 2 . Calculated implicit annual consumption for the rest of life in the unlucky outcome based on the EUCT model, so that the degrees of risk aversion correspond to the ones obtained in Table 1. 
